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I. INTRODUCTION 
The transfer of a person’s assets after death has been an important 
element in the law beginning with the Magna Carta,1 and is firmly rooted 
in American jurisprudence.2  Defining children and heirs for probate 
 
†    Robert McLeod is a partner at the Minneapolis law firm Lindquist & Vennum, 
PLLP, practicing in the area of estates and trusts law.  He received his B.A. in Financial 
Management and Economics from the University of St. Thomas and his J.D. and LL.M. 
in Taxation from William Mitchell College of Law.  He is a certified public accountant.  
In addition to his practice, McLeod is an adjunct professor at William Mitchell College of 
Law, where he teaches Estates and Trusts.  The views expressed in this case note do not 
represent the views of Lindquist & Vennum, PLLP, nor any of its clients. 
1. June 15, 1215, Runnymede, England (addressing the transfer of property after 
death in least five of sixty-three paragraphs). 
 2. Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787 (discussing intestate succession in 
1
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purposes remains a difficult issue.  In particular, the determination of 
children and heirs in an age when the birth of “illegitimate” children is 
common makes the proper and just determination of heirship a recurring 
and timely topic.  The Minnesota Probate Code defines the term “child” 
and provides: “a person is the child of the person’s parents regardless of 
the marital status of the parents and the parent and child relationship may 
be established under the Parentage Act, sections 257.51 to 257.74.”3  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court recently interpreted this provision in In re 
Estate of Palmer.4  The court held that in a probate proceeding paternity 
may be established by clear and convincing evidence without having to 
use the Parentage Act.5 
A.  Summary of the Case 
The Palmer case arose from the probate of the estate of James A. 
Palmer.  The decedent, James A. Palmer, and his wife, Marie, married in 
1948, and remained married for fifty-one years, until the decedent’s 
death in 1999.6  There were no children born to the decedent and his 
wife.7 
Michael J. Smith was born out of wedlock on Sept. 7, 1957, to 
Beverly A. Smith.8  In 1959, the decedent was charged with and pled 
guilty to the crime of “illegitimacy” in a Municipal Court.9  At that time, 
Michael Smith’s birth certificate was altered to add James A. Palmer as 
the father with a written note “adjudication of paternity report.”10  In 
addition, the decedent maintained a relationship with Michael Smith 
throughout the child’s life.11  At the time of the decedent’s death he 
owned a one-half interest in his primary residence located in Ramsey 
County, Minnesota.12  The decedent’s wife did not own any legal interest 
 
paragraph 2). 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-114 (2002). 
 4. 658 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 2003). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 197-98. 
 7. Id. at 198. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (finding that decedent visited Michael throughout childhood, hunted, golfed 
and made numerous trips to a lake cabin with Michael). 
 12. The decedent and his brother, Jerome L. Palmer, each inherited one-half of the 
home after the death of their father, Albert Frank Palmer, in 1983.  Brief for Appellant at 
7 n.1, In re Estate of Palmer, 658 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 2003).  Jerome subsequently died 
and his one-half interest in the home descended to Jerome’s wife, Lorraine Palmer, who 
remains the owner of the other one-half interest in the home.  Id. 
2
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in the home. 
Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-402 provides for descent and 
distribution of the decedent’s interest in the home.  Under this statute, if 
the decedent is survived only by his wife, then his entire interest in the 
home passes to his wife in fee simple.13  If the decedent is survived by 
his wife and any issue, then his wife receives a life estate in the home 
and the decedent’s issue receive the remainder interest.14 
The estate of the decedent was submitted to the court for probate 
and Michael Smith filed a petition for summary assignment or 
distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate.15  Mrs. Palmer objected, 
maintaining that (a) Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-114(2) of the 
Probate Code requires the establishment of paternity before heirship can 
be asserted, and (b) that the time for adjudicating paternity had expired 
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes sections 257.51 and 257.74 of the 
Minnesota Parentage Act.16 
The trial court dispensed with the statute of limitations, determined 
that the Minnesota Parentage Act was optional in probate matters, and 
allowed Michael Smith to establish paternity under a common law 
standard of clear and convincing evidence.17  Thereafter, the court issued 
an order granting summary assignment and distribution of estate assets, 
awarding Michael Smith a share in the decedent’s estate.18  The order of 
the trial court was affirmed by the court of appeals and the supreme 
court.19 
B.  Focus of Case Note 
Application of this ruling to future probate proceedings creates 
several issues.  To understand the implications of this case, this essay 
will review the constitutional issues related to the probate definition of 
children, discuss the history of the debate on the determination of 
children and heirs in a probate proceeding,20 identify the current frictions 
in the law,21 and analyze the effect of the current Minnesota Supreme 
Court ruling on prospective cases.22 
 
 13. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402(a)(1) (1999). 
 14. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402(a)(2) (1999). 
 15. Palmer, 658 N.W.2d at 198. 
 16. Id. at 198-99. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 199-200. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Parts V-VI. 
3
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
It is important to first address the basic constitutional implications 
of inheritance for probate purposes including the constitutional 
implications of treating legitimate and illegitimate children differently in 
a probate proceeding. 
A.  Equal Protection 
In 1977, in the case Trimble v. Gordon,23 the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared an Illinois statute unconstitutional (a statute that was 
substantially identical to Minnesota Statutes section 525.173, repealed in 
1996) as a denial of equal protection because the statute denied an 
illegitimate child an inheritance interest from the child’s father.24  The 
Court concluded that a distinction based solely upon the “legitimacy” of 
the child violates the guarantees of equal protection.25  In 1986, the 
Supreme Court clarified the equal protection analysis in Reed v. 
Campbell26 when it held that while states cannot make arbitrary 
distinctions based upon legitimacy, they may make distinctions 
necessary for the orderly settlement of an estate, including the imposition 
of statutes of limitations and other procedural restrictions in a probate 
proceeding.27  Therefore, probate heirship statutes must always be 
viewed with an eye toward observing the constitutional protections 
afforded illegitimate children under Trimble, particularly when 
interpreting a statute that defines children for probate purposes. 
Minnesota case law also has a history of protecting the interests of 
illegitimate children, and such interests were considered in Palmer.28  
The Appellant argued in Palmer that Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-
114 should be read in a manner that prevents inheritance by potential 
illegitimate children from their putative father if paternity was not 
established pursuant to the Parentage Act.29  While that argument 
implicated this constitutional issue, the Minnesota courts did not agree 
with Appellant’s argument, noting the legislature’s clear intent to protect 
the interests of illegitimate children.30  Thus the constitutionality of the 
 
 23. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 24. Id. at 775-76. 
 25. Id. at 776. 
 26. 476 U.S. 852 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 855-56. 
 28. In re Estate of Palmer, 658 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Minn. 2003) (citing Voss v. 
Duerscherl, 425 N.W.2d 828, 830 n.7 (Minn. 1988)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 199-200. 
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statute was not squarely addressed.31 
B.  The Takings Clause; Inheritance as a Property Right 
The U.S. Supreme Court has provided some guidance on 
inheritance rights or, more accurately, the lack thereof.  In Hodel v. 
Irving,32 the Supreme Court analyzed a federal statute that eliminated the 
devise or descent of real property on certain Indian lands if the property 
was valued at $100 or less.33  The Court considered whether such a 
statute implicates the takings clause without just compensation.34  The 
Court concluded that the right to devise property is included among the 
bundle of rights in property because the right to exclude, via devise, is a 
recognized property interest.35  The Court then held that such a right may 
not be taken without satisfying constitutional protections.36 
On the other hand, the Court did not find that there was any right to 
inherit on the part of heirs.37  The Court held the heirs had not been 
deprived of any property interest.  An inheritance is merely a hope and is 
not a legal interest in property.  The Minnesota Supreme Court in Palmer 
briefly discussed this constitutional issue during oral argument, but 
because of the court’s ultimate decision, this issue was not addressed. 
III. HISTORY 
The history of Minnesota probate law has traditionally made a harsh 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, whereby “a child 
born out of wedlock was said to be filius nullius, the child of no one, or 
filius populi, the child of the people.”38 
This policy continued with the probate descent and distribution law 
contained in Minnesota Statutes section 525.172.  This statute required 
an illegitimate child to meet a burden of proof different from a legitimate 
child before the illegitimate child could inherit from a deceased parent.39  
In 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court added a clear and convincing 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
 33. Id. at 709; see Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-459, Tit. II, 
96 Stat. 2519. 
 34. Id. at 713-16. 
 35. Id. at 716. 
 36. Id. at 717-18. 
 37. See id. at 718. 
 38. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Minn. 1978) (citing Jung v. St. Paul 
Fire Dept. Relief Ass’n, 27 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1947)) (other citation omitted). 
 39. MINN. STAT. § 525.172 (1971) (repealed 1985). 
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standard of proof to section 525.172 for actions brought after the death of 
the putative father because there was no statute that addressed post-
mortem actions at that time.40 
In 1980, after the Weber decision, the legislature passed a revised 
Uniform Parentage Act.41  The clearly stated intent of the Act was to 
provide an exclusive basis for the determination of paternity.42  In 1985, 
the legislature repealed Minnesota Statutes section 525.172 (1983) and 
adopted portions of the then existing Uniform Probate Code.  Included in 
the adopted portions of the Uniform Probate Code was the new section 
524.2-109(2),43 which began to make it easier for illegitimate children to 
inherit from a putative father.  To carry out this intent, the Uniform 
Probate Code provides two alternatives to define “child” and “children.” 
The first alternative is for states that have not adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act.  Such states were encouraged to refer to “applicable state 
law”—that is, to adopt the provisions of their common law.44  Minnesota 
Statutes sections 524.2-109(2)(i) and (ii) (1985) articulated the law that 
existed before enactment of the Minnesota Parentage Act (“MPA”), and 
specifically provided that a child born out of wedlock would inherit from 
the father only if, before the death of the father, (1) the natural parents 
had married, or attempted to marry;45 or (2) the paternity was established 
by adjudication or by acknowledgment, consent, or agreement pursuant 
to sections 257.51 to 257.74.46  If the father was deceased, then paternity 
could be established by clear and convincing proof.47  The 1985 law 
adopted the existing state common law. 
The second alternative, for states that have adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act (i.e., the MPA), would have repealed all of the 1985 
provisions of section 524.2-109(2) and replaced it with language that 
simply provides “a person is the child of the person’s parents regardless 
of the marital status of the parents and the parent and child relationship 
may be established under the parentage act, sections 257.51 to 257.74.”48  
In 1985, the Minnesota legislature adopted the first option under the 
Uniform Probate Code.  That option was wrong because it was the option 
intended only for states that had not adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. 
 
 40. Weber, 269 N.W.2d at 895. 
 41. The Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA), MINN. STAT. § 257.55-74 (1980). 
 42. See Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn. 2001). 
 43. 1985 Minn. Laws, c. 250, § 9. 
 44. See Comment to the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-114 (2-109). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-109(2)(i) (1985) (amended 1986). 
 46. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-109(2)(ii) (1985) (amended 1986). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 1986 Minn. Laws c. 3, art. 3, § 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 524.2-109(2)). 
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The 1985 law therefore created two broad problems.  First, the 1985 
probate definition of “child” and “children” adhered to the old 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it did 
not refer to them as such).  Second, it created two standards of proof and 
forums to determine paternity: (1) the MPA in Minnesota Statutes 
section 257.51 et seq. (1985), and (2) a probate proceeding pursuant to 
section 524.2-109(2) (1985).  This choice was inconsistent with the 
MPA. 
The 1986 Special Session of the legislature corrected the mistake in 
section 524.2-109(2) and enacted the Uniform Probate Code’s second 
option for the definition of children.  In 1994, section 524.2-109 was 
retitled section 524.2-114, but the substantive provisions did not 
change.49 
Despite this statutory crafting to eliminate distinctions between 
legitimate and illegitimate children, the Palmer decision clarified the 
definition of children in probate proceedings and, in effect, requires 
illegitimate children to carry the burden of proof that was abandoned so 
many years ago.  Illegitimate children will find themselves at a 
disadvantage in a probate proceeding because despite any determination 
of parentage made while the child’s parent was alive, the illegitimate 
child will have to prove paternity again after the parent’s death. 
IV. CURRENT FRICTION IN THE LAW 
The issues related to defining children for probate purposes 
continue to emerge in several areas including adult adoptions and 
intestacy. 
A.  Adult Adoption 
In addition to jurisdiction over intestate proceedings, the probate 
court has jurisdiction over wills50 and trusts,51 including interpreting 
such documents.  Wills and trusts often define the terms “child,” “issue,” 
or “heirs,” but sometimes the definitions are absent or incomplete, or do 
not contemplate facts that may emerge.  In such cases, the court must 
apply common law principles that invariably compare the intestate 
definitions to wills and trusts.  Thus, the definition of children for 
intestate purposes of section 524.2-114 has implications for wills and 
trusts. 
 
 49. 1994 Minn. Laws 1994 c. 472, § 9. 
 50. See MINN. STAT. § 524.1-302 (2002). 
 51. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.24 (2002). 
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For example, in In re Lane,52 the court was required to apply the 
trustor’s intent with the current interpretation of child and children.53  
The Lane case involved four trusts.54  A trust beneficiary who had no 
children decided to adopt the adult son of his sister.55  He did this 
because his sister had been disinherited by the trustor (their grandfather) 
but her issue were not specifically disinherited.56  By adopting his 
sister’s son, the son became a beneficiary of the trust.57  At issue was 
whether the adult adoption was valid for purposes of making the adopted 
child a trust beneficiary.58 
At this point it is important to note the case of Berston v. Minnesota  
Department of Public Welfare.59  The case is important for two reasons.  
First, the Berston court ruled that in Minnesota, you can adopt an adult.60  
Second, in dicta, the court stated that the apparent purpose of the adult 
adoption was to frustrate the trustor’s intent.61  The court indicated that if 
the trust in question ever came before it on the issue of whether the 
adoption made the child a beneficiary, the court may hold that the 
adoption was intended to frustrate the trustor’s intent and therefore the 
adopted adult is not a trust beneficiary.62  The Lane case is 
distinguishable from Berston because in Lane the trust documents 
contemplate that adopted children may become beneficiaries.63  The 
Lane court also noted that it was only the trustor’s granddaughter who 
was disinherited and not her children.64  Thus, the adoption of the 
disinherited granddaughter’s child was not specifically contrary to the 
trustor’s intent.65  The appeals court, citing case law that supports the 
uniform protection of the interests and rights of adopted children, upheld 
the trial court’s ruling that the adult adoption in that case made the 
adopted child a beneficiary.66 
 
 52. 660 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 53. Id. at 425-27. 
 54. See id. at 423-24 (describing the Lane family tree and creation of trusts). 
 55. See id. at 424. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 424-25. 
 58. Id. at 427 (holding the adult adoptee the beneficiary of the trust). 
 59. 296 Minn. 24, 206 N.W.2d 28 (1973). 
 60. Id. at 27, 206 N.W.2d at 30. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See In re Lane, 660 N.W.2d at 426. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 427. 
 66. Id. at 426 (citing Toombs v. Daniel, 361 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1985); In re 
Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 408, 250 N.W.2d 163, 167 (1977); In re Nash, 265 Minn. 
412, 416, 122 N.W.2d 104, 107 (1963)). 
8
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B.  Contrary Interpretation of Section 2-114 
Every state, other than Minnesota, that has interpreted a statute 
similar to Uniform Probate Code section 2-114 has ruled that the 
applicable state Parentage Act must be used to establish parentage in a 
probate proceeding.67  Further, no state with a similar statute, other than 
Minnesota, applies a common law clear-and-convincing test to establish 
paternity in a probate proceeding. 
At least one other court, the North Dakota Supreme Court, ruled 
that language substantially identical to Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-
114(2) (1999) is intended to apply the entire (North Dakota) Parentage 
Act as the exclusive basis to determine the parent and child relationship 
for purposes of intestate succession, and did not apply a clear and 
convincing standard.68  In the case, In re Estate of Sorenson, a married 
woman moved in with her brother-in-law in North Dakota.  Sometime 
later a child was born.69  The married woman named her husband as the 
father on the birth certificate.70  After the brother-in-law died, the child 
sought a determination of parentage to inherit from the brother-in-law as 
his alleged illegitimate son.71  The court held that the probate definition 
of child provides that “the parent and child relationship may be 
established under the Uniform Parentage Act.”72  It also held that the 
statute of limitations under the North Dakota Parentage Act bars the 
determination of heirship.73 
Unlike Sorensen, the Palmer case provides that parentage may be 
established by clear and convincing evidence or by the Parentage Act.74  
At least two other courts have held that while the Parentage Act must be 
used to establish the parent and child relationship in probate, the 
Parentage Act statute of limitations does not bar a probate proceeding to 
establish parentage.75  In an extensive discussion of the issue, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Wingate v. Estate of Ryan76 overturned a 
 
 67. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sorensen, 411 N.W.2d 362 (N.D. 1987); Wingate v. 
Estate of Ryan, 693 A.2d 457 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); In re Nocita, 914 S.W.2d 
358 (Mo. 1996). 
 68. In re Sorensen, 411 N.W.2d at 364-65. 
 69. Id. at 363. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 364 (quoting  N.D. CENT. CODE STAT. § 30.1-04-09 (2003)). 
 73. Id. at 366. 
 74. In re Estate of Palmer, 658 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Minn. 2003). 
 75. See In re Nocita, 914 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. 1996); Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 693 
A.2d 457 (N.J. 1997). 
 76. Wingate, 693 A.2d at 457. 
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decision by its court of appeals.77  The supreme court ruled that while the 
parent and child relationship is established only as provided by the New 
Jersey Parentage Act, the statute of limitations under such act does not 
bar a determination of heirship under the Probate Code if the Probate 
Code statute of limitations has not run.78 
The Minnesota decision stands alone to interpret a uniform statute 
in a manner that does not require application of the Uniform Parentage 
Act even though the Act is specifically referenced for application in the 
probate statute.79 
V. WHAT IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE? 
The clear and convincing evidence standard will be applied on a 
case-by-case basis.  A recurring issue, however, will be whether a 
determination of paternity while a parent is alive is admissible evidence 
in a probate proceeding.  More specifically, the issue may be whether a 
determination of paternity under older paternity statutes is admissible 
evidence in a current probate proceeding.  That very issue was a 
significant factor in Palmer, but because of the ultimate decision the 
issue was not resolved.  The issue, however, bears mention here as it may 
arise again. 
In Palmer, the respondent sought to introduce at trial an alleged 
conviction of paternity and guilty plea of the decedent.80  Said conviction 
indicates that the decedent pled guilty to the crime of illegitimacy in 
1959.81  The trial court did not specifically rule whether such a 
conviction is proper evidence, nor did the court of appeals or the 
supreme court rule on the issue.82 
For context, it may help to understand parentage proceedings in 
1959.  In 1959, paternity was initiated by the mother who filed a 
complaint with the municipal court.83  A criminal warrant was then 
issued for the arrest of the father.84  The alleged father then either posted 
a bond or went to jail.85  Of course, if the alleged father simply pled 
 
 77. Wingate v. Estate of Ryan, 676 A.2d 144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 78. Wingate, 693 A.2d at 243. 
 79. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.71(2003) (noting similarity to 
comparable sections within the Uniform Parentage Act). 
 80. In re Estate of Palmer, 658 N.W.2d 197, 198 (Minn. 2003). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 200. 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 257.19 (1959). 
 84. MINN. STAT. § 257.20 (1959). 
 85. MINN. STAT. § 257.21 (1959). 
10
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guilty, he would go home and would be listed on the birth certificate.86 
In Palmer, the trial court discussed the guilty plea and noted that 
“[t]here is no evidence that decedent consented to his name being placed 
on the [birth] certificate” (due to the conviction of paternity in 1959) and 
therefore “the Petitioner has not strictly met the requirements of 
Minnesota Statutes section 257.55 to create the presumption of 
paternity.”87  By concluding that the conviction did not establish 
paternity under the MPA, the MPA statute of limitations would have 
barred any further action by the child.  But the court went on to reason 
that the MPA was optional and the probate court could apply a clear and 
convincing evidence test.  Without referring to the conviction, the trial 
court found sufficient evidence to meet the clear and convincing 
standard. 
Currently, the question remains whether such a conviction is 
admissible evidence, and whether such a conviction is evidence of 
paternity.  Two Minnesota cases have already decided that such a 
conviction does not satisfy the requirements of paternity for probate 
purposes.88  For example, In re Pakarinen’s Estate, the court held that a 
plea of guilty to the crime of illegitimacy is not a substitute for the 
statutory requirements to establish paternity and inheritance.89  Further, 
in In re Karger’s Estate, a conviction for the crime of illegitimacy did 
not substitute for the statutory requirements for parentage or 
inheritance.90  These cases are directly on point in that unless the formal 
requirements of the MPA are satisfied, a criminal conviction of the crime 
of illegitimacy does not establish a parent-child relationship.  If a 
conviction does not satisfy the MPA, then does it serve as clear and 
convincing evidence in probate?  The issue has yet to be decided.  While 
a criminal conviction of paternity may not satisfy the MPA, the question 
remains whether such a conviction is admissible evidence in a probate 
proceeding.  Such evidence appears to be per se hearsay because the 
document establishing such a conviction is offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
The Minnesota courts could have ruled that if paternity is 
established under the MPA while the parent is alive, then the child would 
inherit on the parent’s death.  The result would be that an illegitimate 
 
 86. MINN. STAT. § 257.27-29 (1959). 
 87. In re Estate of Palmer, No. P4-01-5356, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 
2001). 
 88. See In re Pakarinen’s Estate, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970); In re 
Karger’s Estate, 253 Minn. 542, 93 N.W.2d 137 (1958). 
 89. Pakarinen, 287 Minn. at 331, 178 N.W.2d. at 715. 
 90. Karger, 253 Minn. at 549, 93 N.W.2d at 143. 
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child would have to prove paternity only once.  But now, a burden is 
placed upon an illegitimate child to prove paternity twice: first, pursuant 
to the MPA, while the parent is alive to receive child support; second, 
after the parent’s death, at which time paternity must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Such evidence might not include the evidence 
of paternity when the parent was alive.  This means each illegitimate 
child carries the cost burden of proving his or her inheritance interest.  
This cost and evidentiary burden would not be necessary if the MPA 
were the sole method to establish paternity in Minnesota. 
The effect of the Palmer decision is that Minnesota is the only state 
with a statute similar to Uniform Probate Code section 2-114 to require 
an illegitimate child to carry the burden of proof and pay the cost of 
meeting such burden.  These are burdens and costs that legitimate 
children do not bear.  The illegitimate child must prove his or her case 
twice.  Legitimate children never have to prove their status because they 
are presumed by law to be the decedent’s child. 
VI. WHO IS MY CHILD? 
There is one last issue to address.  The test to establish paternity in 
Minnesota for probate purposes is clear and convincing evidence.  
However, the question remains: clear and convincing evidence of what?  
Of the deceased parent’s blood, i.e., the biological child?  A reasonable 
alternate consideration is that clear and convincing evidence may be 
offered to prove the child was the deceased parent’s child for all 
substantive familial purposes (and not necessarily by blood) and 
therefore the child inherits as a child of the decedent. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
If a person dies and a child of the decedent wants to inherit from the 
decedent, the child will have to prove his or her case by clear and 
convincing evidence.  That carries with it an unspoken truth that 
illegitimate children will have the extra burden of cost and judicial 
process that is not required in states that require application of the state 
parentage act in a probate proceeding.  While legitimate children never 
have to prove paternity, illegitimate children, once again, are now forced 
to carry a special burden not carried by their legitimate siblings. 
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